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RECENT DECISIONS
Administrative Law

-

Optometry Act -

Validity of the

Professional Responsibility Rule
Doctor Carp owned a chain of optometry offices operated under various trade names. The advertising for three offices-all within a two-block
area with a common supervisor, and dispensing the same optical goods
and services-indicated that each was independently owned and operated.
The Texas State Board of Examiners in Optometry promulgated a Professonal Responsibility Rule which provided, among other things, that the
practice of optometry under assumed or trade names would be grounds
for revocation of license. Carp sought a declaratory judgment that the rule
was void. The trial court upheld the rule, but the court of civil appeals
declared it invalid, finding that the Board had exceeded its delegated powers in promulgating the rule.' Held, reversed: The provisions of the Professional Responsibility Rule are in harmony with the general provisions
of the Optometry Act and are referable to one or more of its specific proscriptions; therefore, the Board of Optometry did not exceed its broad
rule-making power in promulgating the rule. Texas State Bd. of Examiners
in Optometry v. Carp, 10 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 194 (1967).
The general purpose of the Optometry Act' is to assure and protect the
personal and professional relationship between optometrists and their patients. An optometrist must be licensed before he can practice in Texas,'
and article 4563 of the act provides specific grounds for which a license
to practice may be refused or revoked.4 Moreover, in order to supplement
the statutory outline, article 4556 vests.in the State Board of Examiners in
Optometry broad rule-making authority.! It was pursuant to this authority
that the Board promulgated the rule complained of by Carp.
Rejecting Carp's theory that the specific grounds for refusal or revocation of a license set forth in article 4563 exclude all other grounds for
such action, the court upheld the rule as a valid exercise of the power given
the Board by article 4556. Relying on a previous decision,' it examined
'Carp v. Texas State Bd. of Examiners in Optometry, 401 S.W.2d 639 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
For a discussion of the court of civil appeals decision see text accompanying footnotes 91-95, Fitzgerald, Adminisirative Law, in Texas -Survey supra.
'Trx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4552-66 (1960).
aTEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4552 (1960).
4
TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4563 (1960).
5
TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4556 provides in part: "The Board shall have the power to
make such rules and regulations not inconsistent with this law as may be necessary for the performance of its duties, the regulation of the practice of optometry and the enforcement of this
Act."
'Kee

v. Baber, 157 Tex. 387, 303 S.W.2d

376

(1957).
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each provision of the rule to determine whether it related to and was consistent with article 4563's grounds for refusal or revocation. For example,
the section of the rule prohibiting the practice of optometry under a trade
name was found to be related to article 4563 (i), which prohibits placing
an optometrist's license at the disposal of unlicensed persons, and to article
4563 (b), which prohibits deceit or misrepresentation in the practice of
optometry. The court considered the other sections of the rule in the same
manner and concluded that all of them were in harmony with the act's
general objective and that all could be related to specific sections of the
act.
M.N.M.

Attorney and Client -

State Regulation of Unauthorized

Practice of Law
Spanos, a California attorney, sued Skouras in a New York district court
for legal services rendered as a research attorney in a complicated and protracted antitrust suit. Although he had worked in association with local
counsel, Spanos had not been admitted to the New York bar nor had he
applied for permission to appear in the suit as the district court rules provided. The district court permitted recovery but a panel of the Second Circuit reversed. It held first that Spanos' legal services fell within the purview of the New York statute as unauthorized practice of law and, secondly, that Spanos had failed to apply for admission to the district court.
On reconsideration en banc, Held, judgment of the district court in favor
of Spanos, affirmed: The privileges and immunities clause' of the Constitution precludes a state from prohibiting a citizen with a federal claim or
defense from hiring an out-of-state attorney in collaboration with a local
attorney. Spanos v. Skouras Theatres Corp., 364 F.2d 161 (2d Cir. 1966).
For a long time states have been defining what constitutes the practice
of law within their borders.! In Sperry v. Florida' the United States Supreme Court held that although Florida had the power to determine what
constituted the practice of law within the state and to regulate such practice, it could not enjoin anyone licensed by the United States Patent Office from practicing before it. The decision clearly turned on the supremI2 U.S.

CONST. art. IV, S 2.
See Annot,, 151 A.L.R. 781

(1944); Annot., 125 A.L.R. 1173 (1940); Annot., 111 A.LR.
19 (1937); Note, 1964 DUKE L.J. 190; Note, 59 Nw. U.L. Rev. 86 (1964).
3373 U.S. 379 (1963).
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acy clause,' complemented by the necessary and proper clause' of the federal constitution. In the recent Texas case of Grace v. Allen,6 a court of
civil appeals, apparently relying on the supremacy clause, prevented a state
from impinging upon the right to practice before the Treasury Department.
The Spanos majority relied on the privileges and immunities clause in
limiting the power of the state to regulate the practice of law in a federal
court. The right of a citizen with a federal claim or defense to hire an
out-of-state attorney to collaborate with his local attorney was considered
necessary in view of today's "increased specialization and high mobility of
the bar."" The Second Circuit's reliance on the privileges and immunities
clause rather than the supremacy clause raises the possibility that that court
envisages further restrictions on the power of a state to regulate legal practice. Indeed, the court expressly limited its decision to cases where an outof-state attorney was hired to work on a federal claim or defense in collaboration with local counsel. This clearly leaves open the questions of
whether or not "the New York penal law could apply if the client in such
a case dispensed with the local attorney or if the matter were one in which
federal jurisdiction rested only on diverse citizenship . . . .", At any rate,
Spanos has extended the Sperry -limitation on state regulation of the practice of law further than any case to date.
P.R.K.

Bankruptcy -Uniform
Commercial Code as Source of
Law in Reclamation Proceedings
In 1964 Yale Express System, Inc. purchased trailers and truck bodies
from the Fruehauf Corporation. Fruehauf, after learning that it had extended credit on the basis of an incorrect Dun and Bradstreet report,
claimed the right to reclaim the truck bodies and trailers. After negotiation, Fruehauf allowed Yale to retain the vehicles and pay for them on an
installment basis, receiving as security chattel mortgages which were filed
in accordance with the New York Uniform Commercial Code. Two
months later Yale filed a petition for reorganization under chapter X of
the Bankruptcy Act. Fruehauf made a formal demand on Yale's trustee
'U.S.

- Ibid.

CONST. art. 1, § 8.

6407 S.W.2d 321 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
7
Spanos v. Skouras Theatres Corp., 364 F.2d 161, 170 (2d Cir. 1966).
'Id. at 171.
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for possession of the truck bodies and trailers. The trustee refused and
Fruehauf filed a petition for reclamation. The district court, finding that
Freuhauf had merely a lien and that Yale held title to the vehicles, denied
the petition.' Held, reversed: Since the Uniform Commercial Code has
abolished the technical distinctions between the various security devices, a
federal bankruptcy court ruling on a petition of reclamation should base
its decision on equitable considerations and the substance of the transaction
rather than the form of the security agreement and the location of title.
In re Yale Express Sys., Inc., 370 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1966).
The purpose of a reclamation proceeding is to allow a claimant not in
possession to assert his claim or title to property in the hands of a trustee
or receiver and thus regain possession of the property." Since In re Lake's
Latindry" the location of title determined whether or not the claimant
could regain possession. Thus, a chattel mortgage holder had only a lien
and could not regain possession, but the seller with a conditional sales contract could reclaim his goods inasmuch as he had reserved title.
The court in Yale stated that the Lake rationale was probably defensible
when the case was decided because at that time the states attached much
significance to the form of a security agreement and the location of title.4
However, the code, now adopted in most states,5 abolishes the former distinctions between the various security devices. Preferring the code approach to the old Lake rule, the court concluded that equitable considerations and the substance of the transaction should govern, regardless of the
form of the security agreement.' The opinion is consistent with the Second Circuit's earlier opinion in United States v. Wegematic Corp.' in which
the Uniform Commercial Code was adopted as a source of federal law in
commercial transaction cases arising in the federal courts. The Third Circuit also has looked to the Uniform Commercial Code for guidance in deciding cases.! Should this trend continue, the United States will have "a
truly national law of commerce. '
J.M.M.
In re Yale Express Sys., Inc., 250 F. Supp. 249 (S.D.N.Y.
2 4 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 5 70:39, at 1302
379 F.2d 326 (2d Cir. 1935).

1966).

(1964).

4 See, e.g., Bailey v. Baker Ice Machine Co., 239 U.S. 268 (1915); Interstate Ice & Power Corp.
v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 243 N.Y. 95, 152 N.E. 476 (1926); In re Master Knitting Corp.,
7 F.2d 11 (2d Cir. 1925).
The code has been adopted in forty-seven states, the District of Columbia, and the Virgin
Islands.
"It would be incongruous for the federal courts, historically the leaders in the developmeft
of the law, to continue to employ anachronistic distinctions to determine whether a creditor is
entitled to redeem property held by the trustee when the overwhelming number of states have succeeded in bringing their laws more into line with commercial reality." 370 F.2d at 437.
7360 F.2d 674 (2d Cir. 1966), 20 Sw. L.J. 688.
lsn re United Thrift Stores, Inc., 363 F.2d 11 (3d Cir. 1966).
I'United States v. Wegematic Corp., 360 F.2d 674, 676 (2d Cir. 1966), 20 Sw. L.J. 688.

Labor Law - Railroad Adjustment Board Disputes Decided in a Single Proceeding

Jurisdictional

When jobs once performed by members of both the telegraphers' and
the clerks' unions were consolidated and assigned by the employer railroad
to members of the clerks' union, the telegraphers sought to have the Railroad Adjustment Board declare their rights to the new jobs. Although notice of the proceeding before the Adjustment Board was given to the
clerks' union, they refused to respond, declaring instead that if the rights
of their members were later involved, such rights would be asserted in
.separate proceedings. Without deciding the clerks' position, the Board
found that under the telegraphers' contract the jobs were allocable to
members of this union. The district court refused to enforce the award,
declaring that the. clerks' union was an indispensible party to the proceeding.1 The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal.! Held, affirned: The Railroad Adjustment Board must resolve a jurisdictional dispute in its entirety,
having before it every union concerned in the dispute, and considering
the provisions of all collective bargaining contracts involved. Transportation-Conmnunication Einployees Union v. Union Pac. R.R., 385 U.S. 157

(1966).
The Railway Labor Act provides for the submission of disputes arising
under collective bargaining agreements to the Arbitration Board when
other methods of settlement fail.! Arbitration is compulsory,4 and the
Board's jurisdiction is exclusive. However, when jurisdictional disputes
have arisen between two unions claiming the same jobs under provisions of
two separate collective bargaining contracts, the Board frequently has
been called upon to decide only the rights of the dissatisfied party under
its own contract." Before Union Pac. if the Board rendered an affirmative
finding for the petitioning union the other union would bring a second
action to determine the rights of its members under their contract. The
result was delay and often a featherbedding settlement.
To alleviate the problem, the Supreme Court in Union Pac. declared
that the Board must render a final settlement, giving the jobs to the members of only one union. Rejecting the view that each collective bargaining
agreement could be considered independently, the Court declared: "[I]t is
necessary to consider the scope of other related collective bargaining agree' Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Union Pac. R.R., 231 F. Supp. 33 (D. Col. 1964).
'Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Union Pac. R.R., 349 F.2d 408 (10th Cir. 1965).
345 U.S.C. § 153, First (i), 44 Stat. 578 (1926), as amended, 48 Stat. 1191 (1934).
4 International Association of Machinists v. Central Airlines, 372 U.S. 682 (1963).
'Slocum v. Delaware L. & W.R.R., 339 U.S. 239 (1950); Order of R.R. Conductors v.
Pitney, 326 U.S. 561 (1946).
' Prior to the instant case it was the general policy of nonparticipating unions involved in jurisdictional disputes to disavow any participation in the proceedings. 385 U.S. at 159 n.2.
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ments, as well as the practice, usage and custom pertaining to all such
agreements."' Justice Fortas dissented vehemently, protesting the Court's
"judicial innovation." 8
The effect of Union Pac. will be extensive: Jurisdictional disputes will
now be subject to settlement in a single proceeding; inconsistent terms of
contracts which purport to govern the same area will have to be reconciled;
featherbedding will be reduced. However, new problems may result while
ground rules for settlement are being developed. For example, the decision
presents a potential conflict between the four jurisdictional divisions of the
Board. Finally, the decision poses potential obstacles for the negotiation of
future collective bargaining agreements, since the terms of such agreements
may be controlled by provisions in contracts with other unions if jurisdictional disputes should arise.
W.R.J.

Property -

Conveyance of the Wife's Separate Realty
Requirement of an Acknowledgement

A husband and wife executed a deed of trust for land which was the
separate property of the wife. The notary who took the wife's acknowledgement was a beneficiary under the deed of trust. When husband and
wife defaulted, the wife plead that because the notary was an interested
party, her acknowledgement was faulty and the deed of trust was therefore void and unenforceable. The district court held the deed valid and the
husband -and wife appealed. Held, affirmed: The deed of a married woman
conveying her separate realty is binding between the grantor and grantees
even though the acknowledgement to the deed is void. Diamond v.Bornistein, 410 S.W.2d 457 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
Generally deeds are valid as between the grantor and grantee without a
valid certificate of acknowledgement.' In earlier cases, however, where the
grantor was a married woman the general rule was held inapplicable' because article 12 9 9 ' provided that the conveyance of a married woman's
property would not take effect until the wife had acknowledged the deed
as required by article 6605, "privily and apart from her husband" before
some officer authorized by law to take such acknowledgements. In 1963,
lid. at

160-61.

Ild. at 171.
1 Haile v. Holtzclaw, 400 S.W.2d 603 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error granted on other grounds,
and cases cited therein.
Id.
a Former art. 1299, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. (1962).

'TEx.

RE'. CIx.

STAT. ANN.

art. 6605

(1960).
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pursuant to a plan to expand the rights of married women, the legislature
repealed article 1299 and amended articles 4614 and 4626.' The amendment to article 4614 provides that during marriage the wife shall have
the sole power to manage, control, and dispose of her separate property,
both real and personal. Article 4626' as amended gives a married woman
the right to contract and to sue and be sued in her own name. However,
the legislature neither repealed nor amended article 6605 and thus left in
doubt the effect of the amendments on former law.
The first case to interpret the effect of these changes on the capacity of
a married woman was Kitten v. Vaughn.! In Kitten the court held "that
the Legislature has removed all impediments previously existing to the
power and authority of a married woman to contract, and to bind her
separate estate, and to sue and be sued, by reason of her status as a married
woman."' Following the rationale of the Kitten decision, the court in the
instant case held that the repeal of article 1299, and the amendments to
articles 4614 and 4626, removed the necessity of a separate acknowledgement as provided by article 6605 when a married woman sells her separate
realty. Therefore, a void acknowledgement did not render the deed ineffective.
However, the fact that article 6605 was not repealed has created an
anomalous situation. The deed to a married woman's separate property,
though improperly acknowledged, clearly conveys good title to the grantee.
But before any deed may be recorded it must be properly acknowledged,"
and article 6605 still provides the only means for a valid acknowledgement of a married woman. Thus, in order for the grantee to record the
deed and thereby receive good title as against third parties, the deed from a
married woman must be acknowledged according to the provisions of
article 6605.
C.M.D.

Securities
pectus ties Act

Misleading Registration Statement and ProsExtent of Liability Under Section 11 of the Securi-

Aileen, Inc. had outstanding common shares being traded publicly over
a national stock exchange. In 1963, pursuant to an effective registration
'Acts of the 58th Legislature, ch. 473, S 1 (1963).
6TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4614 (Supp. 1966).
'TEx. REV. Cirv. STAT. ANN. art. 4626 (Supp. 1966).
397 S.W.2d 530 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
Rid.
at 532.
0
' TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6594 (1960).
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statement, additional common shares were offered to the public through a
group of underwriters. Encouraged by the related prospectus, Occhi and
Zilker purchased common shares previously being traded by the public
along with some of the newly registered shares. Shortly after this new
distribution, class actions alleging material misstatements and omissions
in the 1963 registration statement were brought under section 11 of the
Securities Act against the corporation, its officers and directors, and the
principal underwriters. The district court approved a settlement between
the parties and, over the objections of Occhi and Zilker, limited participation in the settlement fund to purchasers of the newly registered common
shares.' Held, affirmed: Recovery under Section 11 of the Securities Act is
limited to purchasers of securities directly covered by a defective registration statement. Barnes v. Osofsky, CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 591,883 (2d
Cir. 1967).
Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 subjects, among others, the
issuer of registered securities to civil liability for damages when the registration statement is materially false or misleading' and gives "any person
acquiring such security" 3 standing to sue. Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co.4
is one of the few opinions considering who can recover under section 11.'
There a group of common shareholders sued for damages resulting from a
defective and misleading registration statement and prospectus which covered the issuance of convertible preferred shares. The district court held
that when a registration statement pertains to only one class of securities,
holders of another class of the same issuer have no standing. Affirming on
appeal, the Second Circuit stated by dictum that only persons who purchase securities which are the direct subject of the registration statement
and prospectus may recover under section 11.' In Osofsky the Second Circuit gave effect to its dictum. Aside from relying on legislative history, the
court reasoned that since the act does not require all shares of the same
class to be registered upon each public issue,7 it is unlikely that section 11
was intended to provide a remedy for holders of shares other than the particular shares covered by the registration statement. Also, section 11 limits
liability to the price at which a newly registered share was offered to the
public; thus, to allow pro rata sharing by the purchasers of the previously
'Barnes
2 1

v. Osofsky, 254 F. Supp. 721 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).

U.S.C. § 77k(a)

(1964).

' Ibid.

49 F.R.D. 707 (S.D.N.Y.

1949).
'While Osofsky was on appeal, another district court in Colonial Realty Corp. v. Brunswick
Corp., 257 F. Supp. 875 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) held that liability under section 11 is limited to purchasers of the particular securities issued under the registration statement.
' Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783, 786 (2d Cir. 1951).
7See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77b (1964)
and 15 U.S.C. § 77f(a) (1964).
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outstanding shares would result in an unwarranted dilution of the recoverable damages.8
Osofsky cannot be considered startling; indeed, the commentators have
predicted the result.' But, a legitimate argument can be made for extending the liability of section 11 to the purchasers of any security of the
same class as that issued pursuant to the prospectus and registration statement. Certainly, a glamorous prospectus will affect the price and trading
of outstanding shares to the same degree as the new issue. But, perhaps, in
light of Osofsky, any broadening of the class permitted to recover under
section 11 will require a statutory amendment.
M.M.B.

Taxation

-

Criminal

Investigations -

Application of

Miranda v. Arizona
A special agent of the Intelligence Division of the Internal Revenue
Service investigated Kingry's tax returns for possible criminal violations.
The special agent interviewed Kingry, identifying himself and advising Kingry of his constitutional right to refuse to answer any questions.
The special agent did not mention that he was investigating possible criminal violations, nor did he advise Kingry of his right to counsel. When the
Government subsequently prosecuted Kingry, he contended that all evidence obtained from him subsequent to the special agent's entrance into
the case should be suppressed on the basis of Miranda v. Arizona.' Held:
The rule expressed in Miranda is applicable to a criminal tax investigation,
and therefore evidence obtained from a defendant in the absence of a
proper warning must be suppressed. United States v. Kingry, 19 Am. Fed.
Tax R.2d 762 (W.D. Fla. 1967).

Mirandav. Arizona enunciates the principle that once a person "has been
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way,"' the investigator must advise the accused of his constitutional right to remain silent and to have the benefit of counsel before any
interrogation can commence. Whether such specific limitations upon police
8 An underwriter's liability also is limited to the total price at which the securities underwritten
by him were offered to the public.
93 Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1731 n.160 (2d ed. 1961). See also Cohen, "Truth in Securities" Revisited, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1340, 1341 (1966).

'384 U.S. 436 (1966). For the impact of this decision on "normal" criminal investigations,
see Comment, Custodial Interrogation as a Tool of Law Enforcement: Miranda v. Arizona and the
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, in this issue supra.
384 U.S. at 444.
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interrogation are equally applicable to the Internal Revenue Service's
criminal investigations has evoked varying judicial responses. One court of
appeals' and four district courts, ' have held that evidence is admissible even
though a special agent did not warn the taxpayer of his constitutional
rights. In refusing to apply Miranda to a criminal tax investigation, these
courts distinguished the normal police investigation present in the Miranda
line of decisions from the tax investigation. In the former, a crime is known
to have occurred, and the investigation is designed to ascertain the perpetrator. In tax investigations, however, the suspect himself is known, and
the investigation is designed to determine whether a crime in fact has been
committed. Furthermore, Miranda's requirement of a warning in "custodial
interrogation" situations does not appear apposite to the typical tax investigation, conducted in the taxpayer's home or place of business with
the subject of the interrogation free to come and go as he pleases.'
United States v. Kingry is the first reported decision to apply Miranda

in the tax situation. The court based its decision on the rationale that protection available to bank robbers, murderers, rapists, and other such criminals should be available to a taxpayer under investigation, particularly
since both types of investigation might lead to imprisonment. It might also
have been argued that the need for requiring a warning is more critical in
a tax investigation since the identity of the special agent, unlike that of a
police officer, generally conveys no notice of a criminal investigation to the
investigated taxpayer. Despite these strong arguments, the rationale underlying Miranda's judicially imposed criminal code is not applicable per se
to a tax investigation. Whether similar, more lenient, or even stricter requirements should be imposed is a question which ultimately, can be answered only by the Supreme Court.
J.B.E.

Taxation -Deductibility
of Educational ExpensesAcquisition of a New Specialty
Greenberg, a practicing psychiatrist, undertook an extensive training
program in psychoanalysis, claiming part of the cost as an ordinary and
' Kohatsu v. United States, 351 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1965). This decision was rendered before
Miranda, but was based on its predecessor, Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
'United States v. Hill, 260 F. Supp. 139 (S.D. Cal. 1966); United States v. Carlson, 260 F.
Supp. 423 (E.D.N.Y. 1966); United States v. Fiore, 258 F. Supp. 435 (W.D. Penn. 1966); Moon
v. Brennan, 19 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 639 (E.D. Wis. 1966).
' See the excellent discussion of the problem in Hewitt, The Constitutional Rights of the TaxPayer in a Fraud Investigation, 44 TAxEs 660 (1966). See also Raymond, Do Escobedo and Miranda
Apply to Tax Fraud Investigations?, 45 MicH. S.B.J. 10 (1966); Note, 33 CHI. L. REV. 134
(1966).
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necessary business expense. The Commissioner concluded that Greenberg's
primary purpose in studying psychoanalysis was to acquire a new specialty
and disallowed the deduction. The Tax Court sustained the position of the
Commissioner,' and the taxpayer appealed. Held, reversed: If the primary
purpose of a taxpayer in undertaking an educational program is to improve his pre-existing skills, the cost of such education is deductible as an
ordinary and necessary business expense even though the taxpayer acquires
a new specialty as an incident to the education. Greenberg v. Conmissioner, 367 F.2d 663 (1st Cir. 1966).
Section 162 (a) of the code grants the businessman a deduction for the
ordinary and necessary expenses incurred in carrying on his trade or business.' Under the related regulations,' the test for determining the deductibility of an educational expense is the taxpayer's primary purpose in
undertaking a course of study.4 Where the education is undertaken primarily (1) to establish a trade, (2) to obtain a new position or advancement, or (3) to fulfill the general educational aspirations of the taxpayer,
the educational expenses are personal in nature and, therefore, are not
deductible. On the other hand, educational expenses are deductible if
incurred primarily (1) to retain employment or status or (2) to maintain
or improve the taxpayer's skills.'
Prior to Greenberg, two Tax Court cases7 had rejected a psychiatrist's
claim that his primary purpose in undertaking training in psychoanalysis
was to improve his skills as a psychiatrist. The First Circuit distinguished
Greenberg from these cases because the psychiatrists in the prior cases had
failed to lresent sufficient evidence to demonstrate that psychoanalytic
knowledge would be helpful in psychiatric practice.. However, although
the First Circuit has adopted a more realistic view than that of the Tax
Court,' it appears that the advantages of the Greenberg decision will be
Ramon M. Greenberg, 45 T.C. 480 (1966).
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 162.
'Treas. Reg. §§ 162-5(a), (b) (1958).
'For a comprehensive "discussion of the deductibility of educational expenses, see generally Comment, Federal Income Taxation-The Ups -and Downs of the Education Expense Deduction, 41
N.C.L. REV. 827 (1963). See also cases cited in Annot., 3 A.L.R.3d 829 (1965).
'Treas. Reg. § 162-5(b) (1958).
eTreas. Reg. § 162-5(a) (1958).
'Arnold Namrow,. 33 T.C. 419, aff'd, 288 F.2d 648 (4th Cir. 1961); Grant Gilmore, 38
T.C. 765 (1962).
'It is interesting to note that the cases of Namrow and Gilmore were litigated by attorneys
for the taxpayers, while Greenberg argued his own case. Perhaps a little psychology was used to
prove this case.
The Tax Court in Greenberg assumed that the acquisition of a new specialty is inconsistent
with the improvement of skills required for the practice of a pre-existing profession. See Welsh v.
United States, 210 F. Supp. 597 (N.D. Ohio 1962), where an Internal Revenue Service agent was
allowed to deduct the cost of his law school education. The court refused to accept the Government's argument that because the legal education undertaken by the taxpayer resulted in the
acquisition of a new skill, the expenditures were not deductible.

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 21

short-lived. Under the proposed new regulations," if the program of study
will qualify the taxpayer for a new specialty, his educational expenses will
not be deductible even though such training may improve present skills.
The proposed regulations indicate that only the expenses of refresher
courses will be considered deductible under the heading of maintaining or
improving present skills. Undoubtedly, many businessmen will have second
thoughts concerning additional training to improve their pre-existing skills
if the proposed regulations are enacted.
M.M.B.

0

' CCH 1967 STAND. FED. TAx. REP. 5 8815 (1967).

